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Opening Space for Theoretical, Methodological, and 
Empirical Issues in Human-Machine Communication
Leopoldina Fortunati1  and Autumn Edwards2 
1 Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Physics, University of Udine, Udine, Italy
2 School of Communication, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, United States of America 
This journal offers a space dedicated to theorizing, researching empirically, and discuss-
ing human-machine communication (HMC), a new form of communication with digital 
interlocutors that has recently developed and has imposed the urgency to be analyzed and 
understood. There is the need to properly address the model of this specific communication 
as well as the roles, objectives, functions, experiences, practices, and identities of the inter-
locutors involved, both human and digital. There is also the need to be aware that in a first 
moment scholars are obliged to use the same words such as communication, interlocutors, 
interaction, and relationship that are typically used in other communicative contexts such 
as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), Human-Agent 
Interaction (HAI) and that this may bring in a first phase confusion and ambiguity in the 
conversation on HMC. Using current language to face new ground may, in fact, introduce 
obscurity in our analyses, as different meanings may be attributed to these words. Take, 
for example, the word communication. When we say that humans communicate with a 
machine, do we mean the same thing as when we say a human communicates with another 
human directly or through a medium? If not, to what specific form of communication do 
we refer? Certainly not of human-human communication, which involves common, cir-
cular processing of the message and meaning. When we say that machines talk back to us, 
we do not mean that this talk is identical to that of a human interlocutor, but the point is: 
what is the difference? In everyday life, much human-human communication also seems 
functional, automatic, and “scripted” (Kellerman, 1992). Today, machines offer humans an 
answer to the question: what is the automatable part of communication?
Scholars who focus their attention and engagement on this field of study know well 
the difficulty they face in exploring the new terrain of human-machine communication 
(Fortunati  et al., 2019; Guzman, 2018). In reality, communication with digital interlocutors 
ontologically is not the same thing as communication with another human, both directly 
and in a mediate way. Here the meaning is built by two entities—humans—that both have 
the biological and psychological ability to formulate, issue, receive a message, and, based on 
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8 Human-Machine Communication 
this message, elaborate another message. Together, during their dialogue, they contribute 
to building that meaning that is the fruit of their common effort by cooperating on various 
plans. The plasticity of the human brain and the empathy humans feel toward other humans 
enable them to produce the circularity of messages and  their flows. Humans within the 
communication process can in fact perceive the environment, the context, the time, the 
various nonverbal languages of the other, share or be aware of the differences regarding 
the cultural and the social dimensions, and, in some cases, hold in common memories and 
the past. Both of the interlocutors involved in the communication process may perceive 
and experience the action of the other in the same way. In doing so, humans transform the 
judgment of perception in judgment of experience, while digital interlocutors can do that 
limitedly because they are not conscious of themselves and the world (Faggin, 2019). 
When the other is not a human but a digital interlocutor, everything changes. The abil-
ity to formulate, issue, receive a message, and elaborate another message is much lower, and 
it is the reason for which we call the other a “quasi-second interlocutor.” We know that our 
interlocutor is a machine, quite special insofar as the machine presents itself as a human 
surrogate that, as Zhao (2006, p. 402) states, simulates possessing the biological and psycho-
logical abilities to formulate, issue, and receive a message, and, on the basis of this message, 
to elaborate another message. That is, they simulate having a mind and a communicative 
intelligence as well as communicative and social skills. In particular, media agents and 
robots are unable to produce “reciprocal meaningful behavior,” which, according to Max 
Weber (1976), is what characterizes social action, leading Höflich (2013) to propose the 
term “quasi-social action” for the social action produced by digital interlocutors. Similarly, 
Höflich (2013) proposes defining relationships to robots as “quasi-interpersonal” because, 
although robots are machines without empathy, their reactions are interpreted as if they 
were social. Alternatively, Krotz proposes “pseudosocial” to name the social component of 
the interaction with a robot (2007, p. 161).
There are, however, other conceptual approaches to communication that may integrate 
digital agents more readily. It depends in fact on how communication is defined whether 
machines may be considered true or only simulated partners and whether and when a dis-
tinction between “true” and “simulated” is worth drawing. For instance, according to Peters 
(2006), although dialogue (understood as a meeting of minds or an integration of egos) is 
often regarded as the best or central kind of communication, it is perhaps an unrealistic 
ideal for most human social interaction. As an alternative to communication as recipro-
cal/symmetrical dialogue, Peters proposes dissemination, a mode of communication for 
“creatures that emit weak, pathetic signals—infants, pets, the dead, most of us, most of the 
time” as well as extraterrestrials, the divine, and computers (2006, pp. 218–219). Dissemi-
nation centers the heart of everyday exchange on the gaps between senders and receivers, 
on the other instead of the self, on the indefiniteness of meanings and consequences, and on 
the irreducibility of embodiment (or aspects of touch and time). Rather than a meeting of 
minds, communication becomes in this sense “the name for those practices that compen-
sate for the fact that we can never be each other” (Peters, 2006, p. 268). 
Similarly, much depends on how the “person” or “self ” or “other” in communication is 
defined. The underlying assumption of much communication scholarship, and especially 
of interpersonal communication research, is that communication must occur between two 
or more people (Edwards et al., 2019). Robots and other communication technologies are 
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hardly considered people in any robust social, ethical, or legal sense. For this reason, Wes-
terman proposes the term “interactoral” to refer to the communication between/among 
social actors (Westerman et al., 2019). Or we might consider the communication between 
human and machine “interpersona” to refer to those aspects of perceived character or social 
role played by any actor. But, is it possible for HMC to actually be interpersonal, albeit not 
human-human? Perhaps infants also are not (yet) “people” (although they are Homo sapi-
ens) and therefore communication with them is not interpersonal in the sense of “occurring 
between full-fledged persons” but rather in the sense that the symbolic interaction between 
caregiver and developing child becomes the context in which persons and selves—along 
with minds, societies, and cultures—are constituted and become real (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 
1934). Is it possible machines might also emerge as persons not because of what is inside 
them or their possessed capabilities, but because we position them as such in our shared 
language and create for them the space to articulate and take up identities in discourse that 
become for us real identities?
Humans are aware that media agents and social robots are quasi-interlocutor, quasi- 
communicator, quasi-social, but they play the game and pretend to really communicate 
and to have social relationships with them. As Reeves and Nass (1996) have noticed regard-
ing computers, it can happen that, within the practices of their use, humans forget that 
their interlocutors are simulating, and they treat them as if they were real humans. The 
strength of this illusion depends on the simulating ability of the media agents. Although 
it is an illusion, and is even consciously recognized as such by the people involved, it can 
generate all the same feelings of communicative and social satisfaction as interactions with 
other humans. As Ho, Hancock, and Miner (2018) recently demonstrated, people disclosing 
personal information garnered the same emotional, relational, and psychological benefits 
whether they thought their partner was a chatbot or a person. 
The profoundly social responses to today’s digital interlocutors represent a contempo-
rary manifestation of a more historical human impulse to call forth, even from the void, an 
addressee. Buber (1970) used the term “pan-relation” to refer to “the drive to turn every-
thing into a You” (p. 78). And where the imagination “does not find a living, active being 
that confronts it, but only an image or symbol of that, it supplies the living activity from 
its own fullness” (p. 78). One might remember how in the film Cast Away, the character 
Chuck Noland, stranded on an island and utterly alone, personified the volleyball “Wilson” 
to be his companion, conversing and arguing with this dear friend for the next 4 years. All 
it required for this heartfelt association to emerge was a genuine longing for relation and 
perhaps also the tiniest material semblance of life: a round shape for a head and marks for 
a face. How much easier is it to treat as You a machine that can speak back, fill social roles, 
and perhaps also resemble a person in physical form? 
In this framework, the powerful effects of familiarity also need to be considered. The 
more humans are familiar with media agents and social robots, the more their communi-
cative and social behavior toward them becomes specific and appropriate as Gambino, Fox, 
and Ratan argue in this volume. Most research in this domain is still conducted on first 
impressions, or at the point of “zero acquaintance” as it is called in psychology. Imagine 
what more we will learn as future research attends to the relationships developed over time, 
both between people and particular media agents and between societies and whole classes 
of machine actors. 
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It is in this difference of abilities, skills, and awareness that the power relationship 
between humans and media agents opens up. Whereas the dialogue between humans is a 
form of peer communication, a dialogue with a digital interlocutor is not so, since the lat-
ter struggles to make itself sufficiently credible as a quasi-second interlocutor. The greater 
power that humans have, however, does not protect them from ambiguity and contradic-
tions. A robot usually has less advanced communication abilities than a human being, both 
inbound and outbound. It has less comprehension ability as well as less language com-
petence and a lack of nonverbal expressiveness. From a communication point of view, 
the power relationship between humans and robots hangs heavily toward humans, to the 
point that some children have been shown to consider the robot DORO as a child younger 
than themselves or as disabled (Fortunati et al., 2018). However, we would be wrong if we 
assumed this difference in power to automatically benefit humans. As in any relationship 
characterized by a power imbalance, those with less power (e.g., social robots) nevertheless 
exercise power over those with more, as the former oblige the latter to shape their expecta-
tions and behavior in the interaction in an “as if ” mode. 
To make the relationship work, humans must adjust their communication practices 
to the less advanced communication skills of the robot and act accordingly (Höflich, 2013; 
Krotz, 2007, p. 160). To adjust probably means frustration for humans because they must 
stay within the tight limits of what can be automated in communication. In conversations, 
human beings use multiple registers—from the pragmatic to the affective, the cultural to 
the spiritual—and they pass from one to another with ease. What happens when we have to 
stop in front of certain fences and thereby accept limitations on our communicative fluid-
ity? What is sure is that these power dynamics contribute to originate a twofold process: the 
robotization of humans and the humanization of robots. 
The problem that remains open is to understand why humans tend to apply this “as if ” 
behavior. We try to advance a tentative interpretation here. Human beings cannot attri-
bute full value to themselves because their being has been given to them by other humans 
and is thus taken as given, whereas machines are their creatures, having been generated by 
humans. In our opinion, the impossibility for humans to attribute full value to themselves 
explains the value transfer onto machines and the rise of this behavior in “as if ” mode. Of 
course, this tentative interpretation is not intended to exhaust the understanding of this 
problem. Rather, it is further reason to continue to investigate this power relationship in 
the future. 
The structured asymmetry between humans and machines at the social and commu-
nicative levels also has implications regarding the methodologies we can apply to inves-
tigate this new field of research. This volume includes empirical research that concerns 
people’s perceptions, conceptualizations, attitudes, and behavior toward media agents and 
social robots (Guzman; Rodríguez-Hidalgo; Lutz & Tamò-Larrieux; McEwen et al.; Ling 
& Björling). The results illuminate important aspects of users’ opinions and attitudes in 
this concern. But what happens when we would like to or need to investigate the second 
semi-interlocutor; that is, the media agent or social robot? Does it make sense to interview 
digital interlocutors? Or to administer a questionnaire to them? With which methodolog-
ical tools should we approach them? Maybe nonparticipant observation and content anal-
ysis of what they say in order to study the type of conversation that takes place between 
humans and them? 
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These few lines allow us to sketch the right approach that we should take toward this 
new genealogy of machines. It is the approach suggested by Aristotle, who in the Metaphy-
sics (1:2:983a:14) declared that he appreciated the thaumata (τῶν θαυμάτων ταὐτόματα), 
the “automatic puppets,” for their ability to intellectually surprise and stimulate theoreti-
cal questions. Like the automatic puppets of Aristotle, social robots stimulate important, 
ontological questions about who we are as human beings and how our brains and emotions 
work. Some scholars have already accepted this challenge (e.g., Edwards, 2018). Others have 
decided to take up this challenge of further developing the study of human-machine com-
munication with stimulating theoretical arguments as well as stimulating empirical investi-
gations. The insight that these seven articles collectively enable us to develop further is that 
current digital artifacts are no longer the mediators between us and the world because they 
have incorporated the world and are the other with whom we interact (Rivoltella & Rossi, 
2019, pp. 81–82). 
The first article, “Toward an Agent-Agnostic Transmission Model: Synthesizing Anthro-
pocentric and Technocentric Paradigms in Communication,” is written by Jaime Banks and 
Maartje de Graaf. It is a theoretical paper that contends the need to revise the analysis of 
some important elements of communication following the phenomenological, ontological, 
and operational shifts in communication processes emerging in the last decades. In reality, 
this need for revision lies in the transformations that both humans and machines have 
undertaken. Now humans are hybridized with machines since they include a certain num-
ber of technologies in their bodies (such as prostheses, pacemakers, and microchips like 
those for Parkinson’s care). Likewise, their domestic sphere and even their everyday lives 
have been colonized by machinization processes. On the other hand, machines have become 
much more similar to human beings by incorporating AI, neural networks, machine learn-
ing, sensors, and biological components. The traditional ontological boundaries between 
humans, animals, plants, and objects have blurred, and since the conceptualization of these 
entities forms the basis of the social representation of reality, it is worth making an effort to 
clarify their scientific definitions. These transformations have made necessary the creation 
of new conceptual tools to analyze not only the main elements of communication processes 
but also to innovate even the model of analysis. The authors take one of the most popular 
models, the Shannon and Weaver (1949) model, and shows its present inadequacy for the 
reasons we mentioned so far. In particular, they propose integrating the anthropocentric 
and the technocentric approaches via a new agent-agnostic framework for human-machine 
communication. This framework is based on three criteria that both humans and machines 
can satisfy: agency, interactivity, and influence. 
The second paper, “Ontological Boundaries between Humans and Computers and the 
Implications for Human-Machine Communication” by Andrea L. Guzman, addresses the 
important issue of the social representations of humans and machines. When machines 
are able to acquire various degrees of similarity to humans in terms of intelligence and 
emotion, it is crucial to explore whether and how people’s notions of human and machine 
converge and diverge. To develop her discourse, Guzman presents two qualitative research 
projects offering 73 semi-structured interviews with U.S. American adults. The specific 
machines she investigates are voice-based AI assistants, like Siri, and automated-writing 
software. She reviews the main ontological differences between humans and machines that 
the conceptual universe of her informants reveal. The differences detected are the origin 
12 Human-Machine Communication 
of being, degree of autonomy, status as tool or tool-user, level of intelligence, emotional 
capabilities, and flaws. Guzman discusses these differences in terms of their implications for 
human-machine communication. 
People have always talked to technologies while using them because, as Reeves and 
Nass (1996) showed, we tend to treat machines as if they were humans. But our words 
were a kind of aloud or “between us and us” monologue and consisted of a large variety 
of comments: from rude comments such as “you are stupid” addressed, for example, to 
our computer to nice comments such as “how much I love you” addressed, for example, 
to our mobile phone. These monologues were also the expression of a huge difference of 
power between us, the humans, and the sophisticated family of digital interlocutors and 
media agents. Voice-based AI assistants, like Siri, have changed these communicative ritu-
als because these machines are capable somehow of talking back to us. Suddenly, users have 
been forced to pass from a monologue to a dialogue. Of course, the dialogue is still far from 
being a human-like dialogue since it is characterized by a lot of constraints and automa-
tisms, but it is, however, a dialogue. That is, we have passed to another mode and dimension 
of communication. Within a few decades, people have passed from acceptance of talking to 
machines to talking with machines. In the early 1990s, when the use of the fixed telephone 
and the answering machine was studied in Italy, it was found that the first reaction of peo-
ple, especially older adults, was a refusal to talk to a machine. First, the answering machine 
represented a violation of the expectation to find another human being at the other end 
of the line. Second, people felt diminished in their humanity because they had to lower 
themselves to the same level as a machine. This meant giving up their power, their overt 
superiority of being human compared to machine, by agreeing to follow its instructions for 
leaving a message for a human. Within a few years, this refusal and the motivations that 
justified it disappeared. The acceptance of talking to a machine became widespread among 
the population (Fortunati, 1995). 
Now, Siri, Cortana, Alexa, and so on, invite humans to talk with them (Guzman, 2018) 
and to generate a dialogue. Behind them, there is not a human, but an AI that simulates a 
human. In principle, dialogue is the most democratic and equal form of communication 
because it puts human interlocutors basically on the same plane. Of course, the differences 
of power between the two interlocutors count a lot in shaping the dialogue in particular 
ways and giving it some characteristics. Nevertheless, the dialogue makes the interlocutors 
equal in the sense that it is based on the expectation that both the interlocutors share the 
same, basic ability to speak and understand the same language, to have the same cultural 
references, and the same knowledge of social roles, good manners, and contexts. When 
an interlocutor is a machine, we address it cautiously but also with curiosity and interest, 
ignoring for a while the question of our power.
The third article, “Me and my Robot Smiled at One Another: The Process of Socially 
Enacted Communicative Affordance in Human Machine Communication” is authored 
by Carmina Rodríguez-Hidalgo. This conceptual article attempts to integrate the issue 
of affordances within the process of human-machine communication. It demonstrates 
that this integration makes it possible to describe the process of communication with a 
machine more realistically. As she notes, although affordances are discussed often in both 
robotics and communication science fields, the uses and meanings of the terms is incon-
sistent, reflecting object-based versus user-based perspectives, respectively. Based on 
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earlier conceptualizations of affordances, Rodríguez-Hidalgo defines “communicational 
affordances” as “both perceived and enacted possibilities for social interaction in a two-
way iterative communication process, which emerges in the enactment of an integrated, 
sequential relational system which brings attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral effects in 
both communication partners” (p. 62). The proposed new model of enacted affordances 
within this communicative process is exemplified through the specific case of human-so-
cial robot communication. This application makes clear how the material body of social 
robots presents affordances that, of course, contribute to shaping the style and the type of 
communication we might have with them. Thus, there is a need to incorporate the notion 
of affordances within the study of human-robot communication. The work undertaken by 
Rodríguez-Hidalgo is relevant because it integrates two lines of research and debate that 
had not yet been able to communicate effectively. The author has shown in her article how 
fundamental it is to produce this integration for being equipped with the right tools to 
effectively analyze human-robot communication.
The fourth article in this volume is written by Andrew Gambino, Jesse Fox, and Rabin-
dra (Robby) A. Ratan and is entitled “Building a Stronger CASA: Extending the Computers 
Are Social Actors Paradigm.” This is another theoretical paper that addresses human-ma-
chine communication by revisiting the CASA framework (Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass et al., 
1994) drawn from the media equation (Reeves & Nass, 1996). The computers are social 
actors paradigm is one of the most popular theoretical approaches, conceived to describe 
and understand how users communicate with a particular typology of machines: electronic 
media used for the purpose of information and communication. In reality, this framework 
deals with the first generation of these ICTs that arrived in society: the computer. No won-
der that the media equation framework arrives more or less after a shine from the advent 
of the first computers: all this time was needed to reflect on, explore, and understand the 
communicative and social potential of this type of machine. Media equation theory has 
been particularly important because the exploration of the interaction with computers has 
constituted a useful model for understanding the relationship between humans and the 
digital media that have followed. As Paul Ceruzzi notes (rep. in Haigh, 2019, p. 1), the 
computer would become the “universal solvent,” able to dissolve the other machines. This 
expression that “comes from alchemy, referring to an imaginary fluid able to dissolve any 
solid material” is very well suited to describing the potential ability of computers to colonize 
the machines around them. Computers leave for television, mobile phones, and radio, a 
recognizable casing, but they substitute everything inside. Gambino, Fox, and Ratan ana-
lyze and discuss CASA to explain how people communicate with digital media demonstrat-
ing social potential. They observe that the relevant changes that over time have influenced 
humans, machines, and how people interact with them impose the need to revise this theo-
retical framework. They propose to expand the CASA framework in light of these changes. 
They situate this theory temporally by introducing within the framework the variable of 
time (the history of interaction and familiarity with particular media agents and general 
agent classes), affordances, and mindfulness. Among the important implications of these 
extensions to CASA are the notions that people may respond mindlessly or mindfully to 
media agents, with either human- or media-centric scripts, and that learned ways of treat-
ing media agents may influence responses to other people, rendering the script application 
of CASA bidirectional rather than unidirectional as originally conceived. Their original 
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and fresh vision brings an extension of CASA able to accommodate and explain previous 
dissonant findings in research projects applying that theoretical framework. 
The fifth article is written by Christoph Lutz and Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux and is entitled 
“The Robot Privacy Paradox: Understanding How Privacy Concerns Shape Intentions to 
Use Social Robots.” This paper deals with an issue that is quite important and troubling 
to many, which is privacy concerns. The authors examine very well the privacy paradox 
that consists in a kind of misalignment between privacy attitudes as well as opinions and 
related behaviors. As Lutz and Tamò-Larrieux explain, despite people’s substantial privacy 
concerns regarding social media and online services, they nonetheless often disclose a lot of 
sensitive information and only minimally safeguard their own privacy. This is applicable to 
each information and communication technology and even more so to social robots. As the 
authors rightly underline, social robots bring enhanced mobility and autonomy. They enter 
everywhere at homes, hospitals, schools and universities, and other public spaces (malls, 
supermarkets, theatres, cinemas, and so on), and they can take a picture or a video of all 
that they see, record conversations, and capture many kinds of user data. Potentially, they 
can spy on our intimacy: not only communicative and emotional intimacy, but also physical 
intimacy. An older person walking at home may be supported by a robot that accompanies 
them throughout various rooms of the house or apartment, including the bathroom. In 
the debate about social robots, for example, it is not rare to read that elderly people declare 
they prefer to have their private parts washed by robots instead of humans, because there is 
the widespread belief that the robot causes them less embarrassment than a human being. 
Likewise, for informational tasks, people may prefer to ask awkward questions of or dis-
close sensitive information to robots instead of human listeners in hopes of avoiding social 
judgment or disconfirming feedback cues. This trust that people place in robots, sure of 
the fact that these robots defend their privacy, does not seem to be well placed, and this 
creates a serious problem for the communities that are keen to use social robots. Lutz and 
Tamò-Larrieux investigate the nature and level of respondents’ privacy concerns (informa-
tional, social, and physical) about social robots through an online survey of 480 U.S. Amer-
ican adults. This research highlights the importance of considering privacy concerns as part 
of a larger “calculus” people perform to determine whether and how to use social robots. As 
the authors show, concerns about privacy and intentions to use robots are contingent with 
factors such as social pressure from others and the tendency to weigh potential risks against 
other valued benefits. 
The sixth article, “Interlocutors and Interactions: Examining the interactions between 
students with complex communication needs, teachers and eye-gaze technology,” is written 
by Rhonda McEwen, Asiya Atcha, Michelle Lui, Roula Shimaly, Amrita Maharaj, Syed Ali, 
and Stacie Carroll. The authors present a relevant study on the role of eye-tracking tech-
nology in the communication process of children with complex communication needs in a 
special education classroom. The main research question posed by the authors was: To what 
extent does eye-tracking technology represent an effective communication system for these 
children with complex communication needs? Twelve children with profound communi-
cation and physical disabilities such as Rett syndrome (4), Cerebral palsy (2), Brain injury 
(2), Chromosome deletion q13, Seizure disorder and Complex, not otherwise specified, 
were observed and studied over three months. The study took into account three commu-
nication units of analysis: the children with complex communication needs; the human 
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communicative partners represented by teachers, educational assistants, and therapists; and 
the eye-tracking technology. 
Indeed, there is a long history of using machines in education—from the calculator, 
to the computer, to today’s virtual assistants, wearables, AR applications, and embodied 
social robots—and trends suggest that the classroom of the future will be “an intricate blend 
of human and machine intelligences and agents working together to enhance learning” 
(Edwards & Edwards, 2018, pp. 184–185). This integration of educational technologies and 
communication media may be particularly useful for learners with complex needs. However, 
there is little research examining the entangled and co-constitutive human-machine com-
munication environments from which meanings and educational experiences are wrought. 
In his theory of technological mediation, which builds upon on Idhe’s postphenomenologi-
cal approach (see Idhe, 2009), Peter-Paul Verbeek (2006) proposes that the use of technology 
in context mediates human-world relations in myriad ways, including embodiment relations 
(technology does not call attention to itself, but rather to aspects of the world given through 
it), hermeneutic relations (technology represents an aspect of the world), background rela-
tions (technology shapes experiential context), cyborg relations (technology merges with 
the human), immersion relations (technology forms an interactive context), and augmen-
tation relations (technology mediates and alters our experience of the world). Importantly, 
McEwen et al. show that when students use a digital technology for communication, in 
addition to entering into some of the more obvious relations suggested above, they are also 
engaged in communication with the device itself. This is the “alterity relation” in which 
technology presents itself as a quasi-other to the subject (Idhe, 2009; Verbeek, 2006). In 
this sense, eye tracking technology “is not considered as simply a mediating device, but an 
active participant in the communication taking place” (McEwen et al., p. 116). By focusing 
on a communication environment that for the children involved both human (teachers, 
therapists, selves) and technological aspects (eye gaze machines), McEwan et al. effectively 
disrupt the technical versus social-psychological dichotomy prevalent in much educational 
research and demonstrate the value of research approaches that avoid privileging either 
humans or technologies. The research carried out by McEwen et al. represents a precious 
contribution to the theme of technology and disability for communicative purposes.
The final paper, “Sharing Stress With a Robot: What Would a Robot Say?” is written 
by Honson Ling and Elin A. Björling. This paper addresses the topic of sharing stressful 
experiences, which potentially interests a huge audience, from doctors to psychologists, 
from engineers to robotics designers, from sociologists to communication scholars. Any 
progress on stress self-disclosure studied in HRI could alleviate dramatic situations. For 
decades, research in communication and psychology has shown that self-disclosure is cen-
tral to both intimacy and well-being. Opening up about distressing experiences can bring a 
sense of relief, catharsis, and togetherness, and can contribute to sensemaking through the 
act of expression. However, an engaged and willing human listener is not always available 
(they may be absent or facing burnout or caretaker exhaustion) or even desirable (they 
may introduce social judgment or responses that are unskillful or unhelpful). As less capa-
ble communication partners, social robots may even facilitate the process, which brings 
to mind a literary observation of how people may unfold in the presence of hearer with 
communication limitations: 
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“One of the positives to being visibly damaged is that people can sometimes 
forget you’re there, even when they’re interfacing with you. You almost get to 
eavesdrop. It’s almost like they’re like: If nobody’s really in there, there’s nothing 
to be shy about. That’s why bullshit often tends to drop away around damaged 
listeners, deep beliefs revealed, diary-type private reveries indulged out loud; 
and, listening, the beaming and brady-kinetic boy gets to forge an interpersonal 
connection he knows only he can truly feel, here.” (David Foster Wallace, 2011, 
Infinite Jest) 
Furthermore, the presence of a human listener may not always be necessary. Even 
ancient communication technologies have been used to compensate for displaced human 
communicators or to substitute for a human partner. With writing, our approach already 
evidenced the basic twofold treatment of technology as tool and partner; people self-dis-
closed to others through written letters, but they also turned toward the paper itself as a 
legitimate hearer and addressee (as in “Dear Diary,”). Pennebaker’s (1997) groundbreaking 
research shows that even self-disclosure to no one in particular can be beneficial to its 
source. 
Robots, as sophisticated communication technologies, introduce real interactivity and 
sociality. They may prompt processes of self-disclosure by leveraging norms of reciprocity 
in which people tend to match others’ utterances in terms of breadth and depth and by 
building an interaction history of intimacy that cultivates trust and free expression. Ling 
and Björling undertake the important work of beginning to identify the robot message fea-
tures that will most successfully foster positive perceptions and encourage human disclo-
sures. They situate the study in relation to Kahn et al.’s (2011) New Ontological Category 
(NOC) Hypothesis, which suggests that social robots and other personified systems 
may constitute an emergent category of being (seen, for instance, as both animate and 
inanimate) that introduces new patterns of perception and social practice. This article 
presents an exploratory study with a small group of participants (N = 36), but it is still able 
to generate useful indications for future research on this topic. By examining the differen-
tial effects of three types of robot disclosure (emotional, technical, and a novel “by-proxy” 
disclosure) on human-robot interactions, Ling and Björling offer practical implications for 
interaction design and demonstrate the sometimes surprising ways in which human-robot 
self-disclosure may differ from human-human self-disclosure. 
Reading these seven articles is an advantageous intellectual exercise for entering this 
new field of research on Human-Machine Communication. The present volume contrib-
utes substantially both at theoretical and empirical levels by outlining this new field of 
research, giving new perspectives and models, and inspiring new paths of research. None of 
this would be possible without the extensive expertise, constructive spirit, and intellectual 
generosity of the editorial board. We extend our gratitude to the members and manuscript 
reviewers for their thoughtful feedback and dedication to excellence in inquiry. 
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